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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study is to demonstrate that the theological system de
veloped by William Blake in his satirical prose-poem The M arriage o f Heaven
and Hell is both a reaction against and a reflection of Enlightenment thought on
religion. While Blake is typically represented as a counter-Enlightenment figure,
his vision of God as a product of humanity’s poetic imagination is influenced by
ideas exemplified in David Hume’s philosophical treatise The Natural History of
Religion. The difference is that Blake’s populist emphasis produces a vision
which emphasizes the imaginative divinity of the individual, as opposed to the eli
tist theology of Hume.
The paper begins by examining the influence of the counterEnlightenment mystic Emmanuel Swedenborg on Blake’s thinking. Parallels be
tween Swedenborg and the M arriage are apparent in Blake’s conception of the
divinity and in the M arriage's populism. Where Blake differs from Swedenborg,
he clearly has been influenced by the Enlightenment; in particular, Blake’s con
ception of the visionary reflects the Enlightenment’s stress on experience. The
combination of Enlightenment and counter-Enlightenment theology produces
Blake’s idea of the divinity: God as a poetic creation.
After examining Swedenborg, the paper closely compares the M arriage
and the Natural History, arguing that Blake transforms the Enlightenment idea
that religion originates in fear of natural phenomena by stressing the imaginative
capacity of humanity. From this point, Blake proceeds to redefine Hume’s oppo
sition between Hellenic activity and Hebraic passivity. Filtered through Blake’s
vision of a poetic deity, this opposition becomes a productive interaction of con
traries which must work against each other to keep the creative process in mo
tion. This interaction shall lead to humanity’s full comprehension of God (or the
Poetic Genius, as Blake calls Him), allowing for a populist liberation of humanity
from oppression. In this respect, Blake overturns the Enlightenment’s philosophi
cal elitism in favor of a democratic prophecy.
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BLAKE AND THE ENLIGHTENMENT

William Blake’s satirical prose-poem The M arriage o f Heaven and Hell at
tempts to rework traditional Christian conceptions of religion, positing a God in
separable from the human imagination. In effecting this revision, Blake utilizes
Enlightenment ideas of religion, as expressed with a certain typicality in David
Hume’s Natural History of Religion, as the starting point of its imaginative project;
but Blake transforms these ideas into the basis of his own system by combining
them with a revised counter-Enlightenment theology derived from the writings of
the Swedish mystic Emmanuel Swedenborg. Blake echoes Hume in his depiction
of the origins of religion; however, while Hume maintains an elitist distance from
the “vulgar” misrepresentations that give rise to religion, Blake celebrates the
god-making power of the imagination. As a result, Blake’s emphasis is populist
and democratic (exhibiting Swedenborg’s influence), as opposed to Hume’s
elitism. This difference shapes Blake’s treatment of the distinction between
Hellenic energy and Hebraic passivity, another area in which Blake resembles
Hume on the surface. Blake’s conception of the deity, in which God both origi
nates from and participates in poetic acts of creation, appears to favor activity at
the expense of passivity, much as Hume privileges Hellenic heroism. Ultimately,
though, The M arriage o f Heaven and Hell breaks from the dichotomy posed by
Hume, developing instead a theory of contraries in active opposition which al
lows the full exercise of humanity’s divine visionary imagination. This inherently
populist conception is the result of Blake’s radical merger of Enlightenment and
counter-Enlightenment theology.1
It is not clear if Blake read the Natural History: David Erdman notes that
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Blake was familiar with Hume’s History of England and criticized Hume in A
D escriptive Catalog (1809) as a “reasoning historian” on the basis of that work

(Erdman 67).

Northrop Frye further claims that Blake “abhorred” the

Enlightenment in general and “its elegantly skeptical historians Hume and
Gibbon” in particular (Frye 161). Blake’s most explicit attack on the major
philosophers of the Enlightenment appears in the section of Jerusalem entitled
“To the Deists.” Blake defines Deism as “the Worship of the God of this World
by the means of what you call Natural Religion and Natural Philosophy,” attacks
it as “the Religion of the Pharisees who murderd Jesus,” and includes Hume in a
catalog of Enlightenment Deists:
\51taire Rousseau Gibbon Hume charge the Spiritually
Religious with Hypocrisy! but how a Monk or a Methodist either,
can be a Hypocrite: I cannot conceive. We are men of like pas
sions with others & pretend not to be holier than others: therefore,
when a Religious Man falls into Sin, he ought not to be called a
Hypocrite: this title is more properly to be given to a Player who
falls into Sin; whose profession is Virtue & Morality & the making
Men Self-Righteous. . . . Voltaire! Rousseau! You cannot escape
my charge that you are Pharisees and Hypocrites, for you are con
stantly talking of the Virtues of the Human Heart, and particularly
of your own, that you may accuse others & especially the
Religious, whose errors, you by this display of pretended Virtue,
chiefly design to expose. (Blake 201)
In this passage, Blake appears to align himself with religious orthodoxy through
his use of “we,” identifying with the unpretentious man of the cloth as opposed
to the Enlightenment philosopher, or “Player.” The latter is portrayed as an evil
manipulator, a representative not of freedom from tyranny but of hypocritically
moralistic repression instead. Since Blake includes Hume among the Pharisees, it
would seem likely that the two shared little or no common ground on religious
matters. The parallels between The M arriage o f H eaven and H ell and the
Natural History of Religion suggest, however, that Blake found ideas useful to his

developing religious conception in the Enlightenment study of religion.
Whatever his distaste for “the Age of Reason,” Blake uses his visionary imagina
tion to liberate its religious insights from their negative critical context.
Initially, Blake’s innovative prose-poem appears far removed from Hume’s
Natural History in both form and content. The Natural History is a philosophical
treatise written in elegant prose, proceeding in a logical argumentative style in an
effort to prove the origin of religion in fear and to explicate the differences be
tween monotheism and polytheism. In contrast, the M arriage feels loosely struc
tured, consisting of a brief poem and a series of prose sections. Most of the latter
are “Memorable Fancies,” visionary conversations with angels and devils which
parody Swedenborg; there are also expository sections, a brief argument by “The
voice of the Devil,” and a collection of aphorisms called “Proverbs of Hell.” This
structure of conversational prose sections accompanied by illuminations bears lit
tle resemblance to Hume’s traditional philosophical arguments, and Blake’s work
similarly exhibits few overt thematic links with Hume.2 Blake is not concerned
with differences between polytheism and monotheism, or their respective
strengths and witnesses; his M arriage is overtly visionary, an effort to unveil the
infinite nature of the created world and the proper relationship between two key
“contraries,” reason and activity.
Despite these apparent differences, there are affinities between Hume and
Blake. The M arriage's seemingly rambling structure is more carefully designed
than it appeals at first; though its arguments are not logical, the M arriage pre
sents Blake’s theology in a balanced form which owes much to the
Enlightenment. Furthermore, Blake’s visionary project is concerned with the ori
gins of religion, and the “contraries” of reason and activity are parallel to Hume’s
conception of the difference between monotheism and polytheism. These affini
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ties, and the manner in which Blake transforms them, will be discussed at greater
length later.
This thesis will begin not with Hume, however, but with Swedenborg, for
Blake’s assimilation and transformation of Swedenborgian concepts in the
M arriage affected his treatment of Enlightenment philosophy. From Sweden

borg, Blake derives his central idea of a deity produced by and centered in the
human imagination; it is this concept which most strongly influences Blake’s
treatment of Humean ideas in the M arriage. Blake’s populist transformation of
Hume’s elitist celebration of polytheism relies on a combination of Enlightenment
theology with counter-Enlightenment mysticism; thus, Blake’s relationship to
Swedenborg’s writings is essential for a proper understanding of the M arriage 's
relationship to the Natural History of Religion. The reading of the M arriage con
tained in this thesis is traditional; it does not challenge the importance of con
traries in Blake’s writing and accepts Blake’s conception of the visionary imagi
nation. Its goal is to utilize the sources of Blake’s theology to demonstrate how
Blake arrives at his conception of God as the poetic imagination; the thesis con
centrates on how Blake combines elements of Enlightenment and counterEnlightenment theology to produce his own visionary conception of Christianity.
While The M arriage o f H eaven an d H ell draws on mainstream
Enlightenment religious conceptions, it is also a satirical reaction to the religious
philosophies of Swedenborg, a Swedish mineralogist “who had been inducted by
angels into the spiritual arcana of the Old and New Testaments” (Erdman 141).
Swedenborg’s writings differ substantially from the mythographic tradition of
which Hume’s Natural History is a part; where such authors as Hume, Vico, and de
Brosses sought to rationally examine the origins of religion, Swedenborg attempt
ed to depict the true nature of God and the spiritual world as revealed to him in
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his visionary conversations with angels. Swedenborg’s mysticism represents a
counter-Enlightenment theology, stressing supernatural visions over the reason
and experience favored by Hume. Though his motive differed from Hume’s, how
ever, Swedenborg still dealt with issues which play a role in the Natural History:
the true nature of the deity, evidence of his creation in the natural world (for
Swedenborg, in the very form of man), and the pernicious effects of ignorance in
creating false beliefs.

Swedenborg’s handling of these subjects influences

Blake’s treatment in the M arriage , particularly his emphasis on the visionary and
the populism implicit in Swedenborg’s theology. This latter strain is apparent in
Swedenborg’s idea that humanity can attain a portion of the divine wisdom
through a conjunction of the will (defined by Swedenborg as love) and the un
derstanding. At the same time, Blake’s interpretation of Swedenborg is influ
enced by an Enlightenment idea of empiricism (i.e. the value of direct sensory ex
perience of the natural world) and an abhorrence of “priestcraft”; in this respect,
Blake straddles the division between Hume’s Enlightenment philosophy and
Swedenborg’s counter-Enlightenment mysticism.3
Blake developed a profound interest in Swedenborgian theology during
the period just prior to the composition of the M arriage ; he attended the first
conference of Swedenborgians in London in April 1789 and read several of
Swedenborg’s major works, including Angelic Wisdom Concerning the Divine
Love and the Divine Wisdom (trans. 1788), Concerning the Divine Providence
(trans. 1790), and Apocalypse Revealed (1791). Blake admired the first of these
volumes; Erdman states that Blake found the work “something fresh and new
though confirmatory of the human creed he [had] already begun to formulate in
different terms” (Erdman 142). In the Divine Love. Swedenborg suggests that a
visionary imagination is required to comprehend the divine; he establishes this
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idea early in Part I, when he states, “That the Divine or God is not in space, al
though He is omnipresent with every man in the world, and every angel in heav
en, and every spirit under heaven, cannot be comprehended by any merely natu
ral idea, but it may by a spiritual idea” (Swedenborg 3). Swedenborg’s language
suggests that his work is in part epistemological; though he does not investigate
the origins of religion as Hume does, he searches for the origins and limits of a vi
sionary knowledge of the spiritual realm. For Swedenborg, the spiritual realm is
not a physical realm, and so cannot be understood through sensual conceptions
of time and space. Instead, the truly spiritual man must abandon mere physical
ideas and regard the heavens (Swedenborg denotes three heavens, each one clos
er to God than its predecessors) through a purely visionary lens.
This emphasis on the visionary recurs throughout the Divine Love:
Swedenborg argues that mankind must abandon the physical conceptions of time
and space in order to appreciate the angelic wisdom that Swedenborg has re
ceived. (Blake does not entirely accept this counter-Enlightenment idea, as will
be discussed later.) There is a populist strain in Swedenborg’s work as well (as in
dicated above by his use of the words “every man”), particularly in the idea that
all people can achieve the marriage of the will (or love, as Swedenborg likens it to
the divine love) and the understanding required for a perception of truth. Of par
ticular relevance to Blake is the notion of the infinite which this understanding of
the truth shall bring:
It is well known that God is infinite, for He is called infinite;
but He is called infinite because He is infinite. He is not infinite by
virtue of this alone, that He is real Esse and Existere in himself, but
because infinite things are in Him: an infinite without infinite
things in Himself is not infinite but as to the bare name. Infinite
things in Him cannot be said to be infinitely many, nor infinitely
all, because of the natural idea of many and all; for the idea of in
finitely many is limited, and the idea of infinitely all, although un
limited, is derived from limited things in the universe: wherefore
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since man’s ideas are natural, he cannot by any sublimation and
approximation come to a perception of the infinite things in God;
but an angel, whose ideas are spiritual, may by sublimation and
approximation be elevated above the degree of a man, but yet not
to the thing itself. (Swedenborg 7)
By “Esse” and “Existere,” Swedenborg means “to be” and “to exist,” respec
tively; for Swedenborg, God alone is pure Esse and Existere, with all created
things below Him deriving their existence from His absolute essence. In this quo
tation, Swedenborg sharpens the distinction between natural and spiritual ideas
noted earlier; no natural idea can be truly infinite, as all such ideas are derived
from contemplation of the material world (which is by nature limited), not the true
infinite spiritual being of God. Infinite things are spiritual, and are in God alone;
limited things are in the world, and offer no glimpse of the infinite despite their
original derivation from God. In distinguishing between the vision of humans
and that of angels, Swedenborg suggests there are multiple levels of visionary un
derstanding; later in the Divine Love, he indicates that humanity can approach a
spiritual comprehension of the infinite, but only after the soul’s liberation from the
natural, physical body.
The influence of Swedenborg’s conception of the infinite is apparent in
Plate 14 of Blake’s M arriage , where the infinite nature of the “whole creation”
suggests a spiritual reality beyond the natural similar to the spiritual world
Swedenborg posits in the Divine Love (Blake 39). Blake’s conception of the
senses’ limitations, which prevent a total comprehension of the infinite, and the
idea of the soul and body as a single entity, echo Swedenborg as well. Blake ap
pears most receptive to the Swedenborgian ideas which run counter to the
Enlightenment, stressing imaginative spiritual visions over reason; as a result, the
M arriage appears to carry a counter-Enlightenment bias.
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Despite his affinities with the Divine Love. Blake’s vision departs signifi
cantly from Swedenborg’s. Blake suggests that humanity will ultimately be able
to perceive the nature of God to a fuller extent than Swedenborg allows for: “If
the doors of perception were cleansed every thing would appear to man as it is:
infinite” (Blake 39). Blake’s notes on the Divine Love clarify the difference:
“That there is but one Omnipresent Uncreate & God I agree but that there is but
one Infinite I do not, for if all but God is not infinite they shall come to an end
which God forbid” (Blake 604). In this note Blake undermines Swedenborg’s
distinction between the spiritual and the natural; while he admits an infinite God
as the original source of all things (as indicated by the word “Uncreate”, suggest
ing God’s existence before the creation of the natural world), he denies that natu
ral things are limited. “If all but God is not infinite,” there is no opportunity for
the “end” of true spiritual understanding which Blake’s imaginative vision
points towards. Thus, where Swedenborg would limit the infinite to God and the
spiritual realm, limiting humanity to the physical, Blake perceives the infinite in all
things, prefiguring the potential spiritual liberation of humanity.
Similarly, while Blake seemingly derives the idea that “Man has no Body
distinct from his Soul” from Swedenborg, Blake’s interpretation of soul and body
differs from Swedenborg’s. In his discussion of Esse and Existere, Swedenborg
presents his conception of this unity:
Esse and Existere in God-Man are also distinctly one, as
soul and body: the soul does not exist without its body, nor the
body without its soul. The divine soul of God-man is understood
by the divine Esse, and His divine body by the divine Existere. To
think that the soul can exist and exercise thought and wisdom
without the body, is an error proceeding from fallacies: the soul
o f every man is in a spiritual body, after it has pu t off the m ate
rial coverings which it carried about with it in the world.

(Swedenborg 6; emphasis mine)
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Until the final sentence, Swedenborg’s conception sounds very much like
Blake’s, but the notion of a spiritual body distinct from the natural stands in direct
opposition to Blake’s conception of the physical form as “a portion of Soul discernd by the five Senses” (Blake 34). Swedenborg’s distinction between a mate
rial and a spiritual body is closer to the traditional division of soul from body than
Blake’s idea; Swedenborg does not clarify how the “spiritual body” and the soul
differ. For Swedenborg, only God exhibits a true unity of soul and body, as only
God is infinite; for Blake, all things are infinite, and soul and body are thus one in
humankind. Blake’s annotations to the Divine Love similarly note humanity’s
ability to achieve spiritual wisdom while in the body, interpreting Swedenborg’s
ideas in a Blakean sense.
Though Blake found much in the Divine Love that was to his liking, the
elements of Swedenborg which Blake parodies in the M arriage are already ap
parent, and Blake’s notes hammer away at inconsistencies in Swedenborg’s argu
ments. To Swedenborg’s comment that “man, whilst in natural heat and light,
knows nothing of spiritual heat and light in himself,” Blake responds, “This is
certainly not to be understood according to the letter for it is false by all experi
ence.

Who does not or may not know of love & wisdom in himself?”

(Swedenborg 60; Blake 605). Where Swedenborg’s writings appear to diminish
the ability of mankind to perceive God through the imagination by cutting off ac
cess to “spiritual heat and light”, Blake reasserts imaginative power, particularly
by referring to God frequently in his notes as the Poetic Genius. This term, used
throughout the M arriage , suggests a merger of poetic imagination with the di
vine that goes beyond Swedenborg’s conception of a God that, though present
in all things, remains to a certain extent separate from and not fully comprehended
by humanity.
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Blake’s mention of “experience” further indicates that his reading of
Swedenborg is influenced by Enlightenment criteria; for Blake, experience of the
natural world (also important in Hume’s arguments) plays a role in achieving the
visionary understanding Swedenborg imputes to the spiritual world alone. This
application of Enlightenment thought to Swedenborg brings out implications of
Swedenborg’s parallel between the will and understanding and the heart and
lungs which Swedenborg refuses to deal with. Swedenborg likens the physical
structure of human beings to the spiritual structure of heaven; the will is akin to
the heart as the essential motivating force of life, while the lungs correspond to
the understanding, distributing life through the body. For Swedenborg, however,
the biological explanation of the spiritual remains a purely metaphorical argu
ment; the natural and spiritual realms remain distinct from one another. Blake
connects the natural to the spiritual in a more concrete manner. The resultant
merger of Enlightenment and counter-Enlightenment theologies is apparent in
Blake’s treatment of Swedenborg’s next major work.
With Concerning Divine Providence Blake came to regard Swedenborg as
‘“ a spiritual Predestinarian’ supported by ‘Lies and Priestcraft’” (Erdman 142).
Erdman refers here not only to Blake’s comments concerning the work itself, but
also a remark on the Translator’s Preface, which claims that “Nothing doth IN
GENERAL so contradict Man’s natural and favourite Opinions as TRUTH, and...
all the grandest and purest Truths of Heaven must needs seem obscure and per
plexing to the natural Man at first view” (Blake 609). Blake’s response, “Truth
is Nature,” further undermines the distinction between natural and spiritual man
which Blake’s notes to the Divine Love often dispute. Blake’s notes on the
Divine Providence are far less extensive than those on the Divine Love, and all
make the same point as the note on N. 277: “Predestination after this Life is more
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Abominable than Calvins & Swedenborg is Such a Spiritual Predestinarian”
(Blake 610). Blake’s reaction against Swedenborg mirrors the Enlightenment’s
animus against predestination and priests; Hume similarly attacks “priestcraft” in
the Natural History. At the same time, Blake does not reject the counterEnlightenment theology of the Divine Love out of hand.

Instead, Blake’s

Enlightenment tendencies are combined with an emphasis on the imagination in a
manner which radically transforms Swedenborgian theology.
The M arriage o f Heaven and H ell , begun during the period when Blake

was reading the Divine Providence, reflects this duality. On the one hand, the
work overtly parodies Swedenborg in a number of ways. Plate 3 proposes the
beginning of “a new heaven” whose advent was thirty-three years previous
(Blake was thirty-three in 1790, when the plate was engraved), and goes on to
state that “Swedenborg is the Angel sitting at the tomb; his writings are the linen
clothes folded up” (Blake 34). By likening Swedenborg’s writings to the gar
ments which the resurrected Jesus no longer needs, Blake suggests that
Swedenborg’s work promotes not a revolutionary vision, but an outmoded theol
ogy. The reactionary tendencies Blake discerned in the Divine Providence are
satirized in third Memorable Fancy, in which Blake defies the “metaphysics” of a
Swedenborgian angel “whose works are only Analytics” (Blake 42). Blake’s
terminology suggests that the angel’s works are purely rationalistic theology, de
void of the visionary and imaginative quality which Blake initially believed char
acteristic of Swedenborg. In Plate 22, Blake explicitly condemns Swedenborg
himself because he “has not written one new truth... he has written all the old
falsehoods” (Blake 43).
At the same time, judging from Erdman’s account of Blake’s marginal com
ments on the Divine Love, the M arriage’s central idea proceeds from Sweden
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borg’s conception of God:
The warmest part of the new reading of the Scriptures was
a simple worship of Christ as “One God in One Divine Humanity”
and a belief that “Love is the Life of Man.” Blake’s comments
mark his relish of passages stressing the primacy of the Affections
over the Understanding. He sides with Swedenborg and “the
common People” against those who “pronounce God to be invis
ible” and supports his case with the imagery of Songs o f
Innocence. But he must translate Swedenborg’s too abstract the
ology. “Spiritual idea” he reads as “Poetic idea.” The
“Negation” in society that “constitutes Hell” is not “the
Negation of the Lord’s Divinity” but rather “the Negation of the
Poetic Genius”: for “the Poetic Genius... is the Lord.” (Erdman
143)
Blake’s use of Swedenborg provides a clear example of his method: while Blake
parodies or simply discards those ideas from Swedenborg he dislikes, he seizes on
those insights he finds amenable to his project and transforms them into his own
terms. Moreover, his transformation of Swedenborg’s conceptions into a focus
on “the divinity of the creative individual” is in keeping with the more general
shift from mimetic theories of representation to expressionist theories which oc
curred with the onset of the Romantic period (Erdman 143). According to M.H.
Abrams’s classic study of aesthetics, The Mirror and the Lamp, whereas art in the
“Age of Johnson” was perceived as “a kind of reflector, though a selective one,”
with the artist conceived of as “the agent holding the mirror up to nature,” the
conception of art in the Romantic era placed the emphasis on interiority and the
creative imagination of the artist (Abrams 41-2). Abrams describes the expressive
theory as exemplified by Wordsworth:
In general terms, the central tendency of the expressive the
ory may be summarized this way: A work of art is essentially the
internal made external, resulting from a creative process operating
under the impulse of feeling, and embodying the combined prod
uct of the poet’s perceptions, thoughts, and feelings. The primary
source and subject matter of a poem, therefore, are the attributes
and actions of the poet’s own mind; or if aspects of the external
world, then these only as they are converted from fact to poetry
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by the feelings and operations of the poet’s mind. (Abrams 22)
Though Abrams claims the expressive theory did not become predominant until
1800, the date when Wordsworth’s Preface to the Lyrical Ballads was published,
Blake’s earlier writings reflect the central tenets of Abrams’s definition. At the
same time, Blake is focused not so much on the individual poetic ego, as
Wordsworth and Coleridge would be later, but on human imagination in a more
universal sense. The M arriage o f Heaven and Hell does, however, figure this
imagination in artistic terms, as will be discussed in more detail later, and in doing
so clearly reflects the expressivist theory.
While Abrams’s description focuses on the aesthetic dimension of Blake’s
compositional method, Blake’s artistic conception of God in the M arriage is not a
product of Romantic aesthetics alone. Blake’s visionary ideal is intertwined with
his politics; the M arriage reflects a radical populism which stands in sharp con
trast to Hume’s elitism. Blake’s democratic politics are particularly evident in his
transformation of the concept of the passions and its implications for his imagina
tive conception of the deity. Adam Potkay discusses the predominance of the
passions in the writings of Hume and his contemporaries, noting that Hume in par
ticular personifies the passions as controlling agents. This emphasis on the pas
sions (which occurs throughout the Natural History of Religion) has the ultimate
goal of creating a unified community, but this seemingly utopian vision has a dis
tinctly elitist bias:
Of course, eighteenth-century authors always assume that
membership has its price. Clifford Siskin, in the course of arguing
. . . that personifying the passions at once assumes and instates an
ideally unified community, does well to note that Augustan texts
in fact address the personified qualities shared by a very limited
number of people - that is, the elite that reads Augustan texts . . .
This elite community corresponds to what I would call the polite:
those who are actuated in common not so much by raw passion as
by the civilized recognition and refined echo of the less circum
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spect feelings of others. Polite society seeks to unify itself
through shared passions it would outwardly restrain. (Potkay
179)
Where Hume attempts to maintain a polite Hellenism, aimed at an elite community,
Blake puts forth a far more revolutionary perspective less concerned with re
straint. Blake no longer personifies the passions in the direct manner of Hume or
Fielding, but instead recasts them in his Devils, representatives of creative energy.
Where for Hume the passions needed to be repressed in order to maintain polite
society, Blake advocates a recognition and a proper utilization of the energies em
bodied by the Devils. Instead of using rationality to control the overwhelming
passions, Blake supports a heroic artistic activity centered in the Devils’ energy.
This creativity is open to the whole of humanity, as indicated by Plate 14, and is
not to be feared or restrained but embraced (as the angel embraces the fire in the
final Memorable Fancy). The change from passions to Devils is overtly aligned
with Blake’s democratic political leanings through the binding of “A Song of
Liberty” with all extant copies of The M arriage o f Heaven and H ell . This brief
poem introduces many of Blake’s important symbolic figures, most notably the
revolutionary Ore, and expresses Blake’s sympathy with the French Revolution.
Through ‘'A Song of Liberty,” Blake ties the idea of a divinity resident in the
imagination which has gone before to a revolutionary democratic ideology- a po
litical position diametrically opposed to Hume’s polite Hellenism.
Blake proceeds from the conception of God as “the divinity of the cre
ative individual” to consider and alter ideas central to Hume’s Natural History of
Religion. The first striking parallel between the M arriage and the Natural History
also points out the manner in which Blake alters Enlightenment religious thought.
After positing the origin of religion in fear of events whose causes are unknown,
Hume proceeds to a figural analysis of the creation of gods. Hume claims that
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“there is a universal tendency among mankind to conceive all beings like them
selves, and to transfer to every object, those qualities, with which they are famil
iarly acquainted, and of which they are intimately conscious” (Hume 29). Hume
compares this tendency to the use of prosopopoeia in poetry, suggesting that the
gods of polytheism are the product of an inability to think in terms of figures (as
opposed to thinking m figures). The first polytheists attributed “thought and rea
son and passion, and sometimes even the limbs and figures of men” to the “un
known causes which continually employ their thought,” then came to reify these

poetical figures.
Hume’s figural argument derives from Lucretius, whose version of the fear
theory was tremendously influential in the eighteenth century. Frank Manuel’s
study of religious historiography, The Eighteenth Century Confronts the Gods,
discusses the impact of Lucretius:
The most magnificent ancient expression of the fear-theory
was the philosophical poem of Lucretius [De Rerum Naturam]. In
this form it had the profoundest effect upon the minds of
Europeans, after the Renaissance discovery of the text. World lit
erature has few more gripping passages than the description in the
third book of the torments of religious fear, the anticipatory terror
of the punishments inflicted by the gods in Tartarus which poison
man’s whole existence and embitter his every pleasure. . . In
every psychological discussion of the origin of religion the verses
of Lucretius were either quoted directly or were echoed, for his
golden passages, like the “images” he described, found their way
into the souls of his eighteenth-century readers. (Manuel 145-6)
The Lucretian conception of the origins of religion put forth by Hume parallels
Giambattista Vico’s arguments in The New Science (1725; rev. 1744). Vico claims
that “at the same time that the divine character of Jove took shape - the first
human thought in the gentile world - articulate language began to develop by
way of onomatopoeia, through which we still find children happily expressing
themselves” (Vico 150; sec. 447). He notes that the names given to Jove in vari
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ous languages derive from the sound of thunder, indicating the primal origin of re
ligion in fear of natural phenomena, and then proceeds to give an account of the
figuration of gods which Hume’s later work closely parallels:
Human words were formed next from interjections, which
are sounds articulated under the impetus of violent passions. In all
languages, these are monosyllables. Thus it is not beyond likeli
hood that, when wonder had been awakened in men by the first
thunderbolts, these interjections of Jove should give birth to one
produced by the human voice: pa!; and that this should then be
doubled: pape! From this interjection of wonder was subsequent
ly derived Jove’s title of father of men and gods, and thus it came
about presently that all the gods were called fathers, and the god
desses, mothers . . . (Vico 150; sec. 448)
The people, unable to think in terms of figures, give the figures a literal voice, at
tributing reality to gods which have no external reality. The general current of
ideas established in Vico is clearly in evidence in Hume, including the elitist con
tempt for the “vulgar” which animates Hume’s text. In both, the figural analysis
leads to the same end result: a misinterpretation of poetic figures by the “vulgar”
leads to religion.
Hume’s conception differs from Vico’s, however, in its extreme pessimism.
Manuel notes that “Vico . . . had meant the resurrection of the primitive world to
serve profound moral and religious purposes,” and indicates that Vico intended
the New Science to establish that humanity in general had risen above the level
of primitive abasement:
It was an act of piety to establish the true history of man’s
ascent from the feral state and to demolish the false one, thereby
founding God’s law upon sound demonstrations, not erroneous
ones which had a tendency, when disproved in a rationalist age, to
lead men into atheism. Finally there was for Vico a dire warning in
this revelation of the blood and flesh primitive, an admonition to
mankind that if they departed from the rational way of life which
they had achieved under divine guidance and abandoned them
selves to vices, to hypersophistication, like the decadent Romans
of the late Empire, humanity would again “fall back into the dregs
of Romulus.” (Manuel 166)
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Vico’s progressive vision, as outlined in the Conclusion of the New Science, requires a monarch and “the force of laws” to ensure that humanity does not revert
to barbarism, but it suggests that the mass of humanity can achieve a degree of ra
tionality and understanding (Vico 424). Hume’s Natural History, with its concep
tion of a flux and reflux of polytheism and theism, is more pessimistic than Vico,
and less trustful of mankind’s ability to establish truly rational civil societies.
What progress Hume allows for is reserved for an elite coterie of philosophers; the
remainder of mankind would always retain the fear of future events which
prompted their initial figural error, and so would never be capable of a true under
standing of religion.
In Plate 11 of the M arriage , Blake presents an account of the origins of re
ligion which resembles the fear theory exemplified by Hume and Vico, but is sub
tly different:
The ancient Poets animated all sensible objects with Gods
or Geniuses, calling them by the names and adorning them with
the properties of woods, rivers, mountains, lakes, cities, nations,
and whatever their enlarged and numerous senses could percieve.
And particularly they studied the genius of each city &
country, placing it under its mental deity.
Till a system was formed, which some took advantage of &
enslav’d the vulgar by attempting to realize or abstract the mental
deities from their objects: thus began Priesthood.
Choosing forms of worship from poetic tales.
And at length they pronounced that the Gods had orderd
such things.
Thus men forgot that All deities reside in the human breast.
(Blake 38)
Like Hume, Blake finds the origin of religion in a misinterpretation of poetic fig
ures, but Blake’s story emphasizes different things than Hume’s. Blake places a
far greater emphasis on the conscious or free human imagination, suggesting that
the “Poets” who first posited the gods were intelligent enough to realize that
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the gods were only figures. Blake’s choice of words suggests that the “ancient
Poets” were conscious of the artistic nature of their creation; they “animated all
sensible objects,” bringing to life the spiritual side of the natural world. Blake’s
use of the phrase “mental deity” further indicates the conscious creative work in
volved. Unlike Hume, who finds humankind unable to think in terms of figures
from the start, Blake posits a poet-race highly aware that their system was poetry.
The degeneration sets in with distance from the source; it is the first priests who
lead humanity into the error of thinking in figures, not the first humans.
Absent from Blake’s account is the idea that religion originates in fear of
natural events; instead, the initial creation of religion is depicted as a deliberate
artistic process, an act of “overflowing” and “exuberance.” Even before the
crucial closing line, Blake indicates that the imaginary gods are projections of the
one God contained in humankind through the aforementioned term “mental
deity”: the poetic gods proceed from the creative power of the individual and are
imaginative manifestations of the Poetic Genius. This God can only be perceived
through “enlarged and numerous senses” attuned to the infinite aspect of all
things; Blake’s vision of the ancient poets suggests that, in the beginning, all hu
manity possessed this imaginative power.4
Blake’s conception of this creative power leads him to reject the contempt
for the “ignorant multitude” which characterizes Hume’s depiction of religion
(Hume 24). Hume’s view of the common people was typical of the Enlighten
ment historiographers of religion, despite the fact that Vico’s portrayal of the
masses holds out the possibility of progress. Hume draws on the conception of a
primitive psychology which was developing during his lifetime, and applies this
notion to the people in general, who follow popular religion for the same reasons
as the primitives. Manuel describes the Enlightenment portrayal of primitive men

20
tality:
Europeans had been watching and writing about savages
for over two hundred years; a growing interest in child behavior is
attested in works on education; and madmen, particularly demoni
acs, had been the subject of medical analysis during the seven
teenth-century outbursts of witchcraft. At the turn of the century
Fontenelle had still regarded the difference between the primitive
mind and the contemporary principally as one of degree; in later
eighteenth-century writers the mentality of the primitive became
more distinct, individualized to the point where a different human
nature was recognized. (Manuel 141)
The difference in human nature Manuel notes, however, was a distinction not
merely between the primitive and the modern, but between the rational
Enlightenment philosopher and the common, unenlightened man. The educated
were elevated above the level of the vulgar by their superior rationality; the ordi
nary, illiterate masses, in thrall to superstitious religious beliefs, could not be ele
vated to a superior level because their very mentality would not allow it. Like
such earlier mythographers as Bayle and Fontenelle, Hume primarily parallels the
primitive to contemporary savage societies, as when he states, ‘Tn very barbarous
and ignorant nations, such as the AFRICANS and INDIANS, nay even the
JAPONESE, who can form no extensive ideas of power and knowledge, worship
may be paid to a being, whom they confess to be wicked and detestable,” but
Hume’s condemnation of popular religion in general implicitly extends the primi
tive mentality to all adherents of popular religions (Hume 66).
Blake, in contrast, entertains no such ideas of the masses as ignorant primi
tives in his writings. Blake’s radical populism is apparent in his earliest works,
particularly the ballad Gwin, King o f Norway, where the situation of the “nations
of the North” is comparable to “the nations of North America oppressed by King
George” (Erdman 20). The ballad depicts a successful populist revolution against
a tyrannical king, and opposes the rights of the people to the murderous oppres
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sion of Gwin, who is ultimately decapitated by the heroic Gordred. Blake’s sym
pathies for both the American and French Revolutions were later developed in
“A Song of Liberty” and the prophecy Am erica (1793), whose language reflects
the rights established by the Declaration of Independence. Blake’s egalitarian
view of society also manifests itself in the Songs o f Experience , where Blake at
tacks the societal conditions which produce poverty.5 Erdman claims that
Blake’s notes on Lavater provide an indication of his egalitarianism:
The idea that poverty and hunger “appall” the mind of the
charity children [in “The School Boy”] is elucidated by a note
(640f.) in which Blake speaks of “the omissions of intellect
springing from poverty.” In modern terms this would amount to
an observation that juvenile delinquency is caused by malnutri
tion and substandard living conditions, for Blake is talking about
what is mistakenly “call’d Vice.” He accused Lavater and others
of confusing energy, exuberance, and “all the Loves & Graces”in short “all Act”- with “contrary” behavior such as murder,
theft, and backbiting, which is really “the omission of act in self &
the hindering of act in another: This is Vice, but all Act is Virtue.”
(Erdman 129)
Blake’s note proposes a society based not on the hindrance of oppressive law,
but on the free exercise of active virtue by all members of society. “Act” is all be
havior which serves to benefit humanity; “Vice” is whatever behavior works to
the detriment of humanity. For Blake, traditional Christian theology had mistaken
positive expressions of energy in favor of an oppressive emphasis on passive suf
fering; Blake attempts to restore a positive idea of energy by revealing its benefits
to society. This concept accords with Blake’s ideas on the origins of religion in
Plate 11, where the institution of priestcraft curbs the proper expression of energy
and brings humanity into fearful subjection. Thus, Blake’s egalitarianism is a
major force in his transformation of religious ideas.
Hume’s negative conception of the people is incompatible with Blake’s
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democratic impulse and his intense belief in human grandeur. Blake still refers to
the “vulgar” in his account, but they are not immediately to blame for changing
poetic figures into real gods; instead, Blake places the blame for the misinterpreta
tion on a vaguely defined “some” who became the first priests. The tendency to
create external gods with human attributes is no longer a universal attribute of
humankind; it is an intentional strategy by which a minority gain power over the
whole of society.

Blake’s account introduces an Adamic parallel similar to

Hume’s conception of Milton’s Adam; however, where Hume implies (through the
words “as represented by MILTON”) that Adam is a literary creation different
from the reality of “a barbarous, necessitous animal (such as man is on the first
origin of society), pressed by numerous wants and passions,” Blake attributes
Adamic characteristics to the whole of humanity (Hume 24). Blake suggests that
man possessed an original knowledge of the nature of God, but fell from that
knowledge because priests, in order to subjugate the many, reified the poetic
gods.
Blake further develops the idea of the Poetic Genius in the second
Memorable Fancy, in which he dines with Isaiah and Ezekiel. Blake inquires as to
how the prophets could have claimed to have heard the voice of God; the ques
tion presupposes that God is not an external being who could speak in a human
voice, but an internal force. Isaiah’s response restates the argument of Plate 11
concerning poetic creation of the gods in a manner which makes Blake’s own vi
sion of the deity clearer:
Isaiah answer’d. I saw no God. nor heard any, in a finite organical perception; but my senses discover’d the infinite in every
thing, and as I was then perswaded. & remain confirm’d; that the
voice of honest imagination is the voice of God, I cared not for
consequences but wrote. (Blake 38)
Isaiah’s statements go significantly beyond the account of Plate 11; the poetic
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creation of gods is not simply a part of polytheistic religions, but also integral to
Judaism (properly understood) and, by extension, Christianity. The Bible is thus
not an historical record of actual events, but a poetic fiction created by an imagi
native understanding of “the infinite in every thing.” The passage also suggests
that the poets who create the poetic figures of deities are not responsible for their
later misinterpretation. Isaiah wrote from a “firm perswasion” that his percep
tions were accurate, which “all poets believe” makes them so; he realizes the dif
ference between the poetic figure of God and the reality, and so has acted proper
ly despite the possibility that the emergent class of priests depicted in Plate 11 will
willfully literalize his vision.
Isaiah’s words are followed by Ezekiel’s lengthy speech, which exhibits
parallels with Hume’s conception of the emergence of monotheism but also ex
tends Blake’s particular vision. Hume argues that polytheists eventually come to
worship one of their many gods as the supreme deity, either because their nation
fell under the jurisdiction of that particular god or because they imagine the gods
to follow human models of government, with one god ruling all others. Once
again, the vulgar mistake the figural for the literal, and their mistakes lead to ex
tremes of devotion to their new supreme deity:
Whether this god, therefore, be considered as their particu
lar patron, or as the general sovereign of heaven, his votaries will
endeavor, by every art, to insinuate themselves into his favor: and
supposing him to be pleased, like themselves, with praise and flat
tery, there is no eulogy or exaggeration, which will be spared in
their addresses to him. (Hume 43)
Ezekiel exhibits a similar point of view in describing the fervency with which the
Israelites (and King David in particular) proclaimed the superiority of their God
over all others. Once again, though, the differences between Blake and Hume
show Blake’s reworking of this idea. Blake’s Israelites do not propose that their

24
God is superior to all others, but instead that He is the origin of all others: Ezekiel
claims that the “Poetic Genius (as you now call it) was the first principle and all
the others merely derivative” (Blake 39). In contrast to Hume’s (and Vico’s) con
ception that polytheism must be the original form of religion, Blake depicts the
Israelites as pure theists who understood that God was inseparable from the
human imagination.
Blake’s insistence on an originary monotheism as a pure, uncorrupted vi
sionary religion suggests another area in which Blake differs from Hume: an insis
tence on a unity between reason and energy, passivity and activity. Despite
Hume’s elitism, he privileges polytheism because it promotes active virtues, as op
posed to the emphasis Christianity places on passive suffering. Blake, in contrast,
prefers a dialectic ultimately leading to unity. Both the active and the passive are
present in Ezekiel’s vision, in the fervency of the Israelites’ promotion of their
God and in their acquiescence to his rule; the interplay of the two allows for
unity, and humanity’s recognition of the Poetic Genius as a product of hu
mankind’s creative activity.
Ezekiel’s account further suggests how the Israelites’ conviction in this
ideal religion was corrupted by the misinterpretation of poetic figures. This idea
becomes apparent in Ezekiel’s depiction of the result of King David’s words:
.. . and we so loved our God, that we cursed in his name all
the deities of surrounding nations, and asserted that they had re
belled; from these opinions the vulgar came to think that all na
tions would at last be subject to the jews.
This said he, like all firm perswasions, is come to pass, for all
nations believe the jews code and worship the jews god, and what
greater subjection can be. (Blake 39)
It is strange that Ezekiel, presented as a true prophet, gives an account that so
clearly contradicts the idea of God that Blake has put forth. Yet while Ezekiel is
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oddly uncritical of the events he relates, Blake ironizes them by way of their con
text. The use of the term “vulgar” suggests the same class division as in Plate 11,
implying once again that a priestly class is responsible for the reification of God as
an external entity. David’s statement that God “conquers enemies and governs
kingdoms” is not a literal truth, but an expression of the idea that “all Gods
would at last be proved to originate in ours & to be the tributaries of the Poetic
Genius” (Blake 39). David is aligned with the “ancient poets” of Plate 11, while
the unspecified “we” comes to stand for the equally vague “some” of the earlier
account. Ezekiel is unaware of the import of his own story: he is depicting the
same fall from original knowledge described in Plate 11. That these events are not
a good thing is made clear by his final statements; the word “subjection” ac
quires an ironic sense in relation to the enslavement of Plate 11. Through this
choice of terms, Blake indicates how the worship of the Poetic Genius has degen
erated from a true understanding of God as imagination into a tyrannical worship
based on laws. The code of the Jews is paralleled by Plate 1l ’s false ordering of
the universe, further reinforcing the sense of decline.
Ezekiel’s ironic speech calls to mind Hume’s condemnation of corrupt the
ism, in particular the tyrannical manipulation of superstition by the Catholic
Church. Yet Blake’s account once again reworks Hume’s conceptions in order to
promote Blake’s vision of God. As in Plate 11, popular religion is not the problem,
since the people begin with a proper conception of the Poetic Genius. Instead,
the evil influence of a minority corrupts popular religion, turning the people away
from their true understanding of God. This fall from grace necessitates the apoca
lypse envisioned by Blake in Plate 14, where an “improvement of sensual enjoy
ment” shall make the world “appeal' infinite and holy whereas it now appears fi
nite and corrupt” (Blake 39). Blake posits a move from a fallen state where God
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is perceived literally (as an exterior being) to the expanded senses of the “ancient
Poets” and an imaginative appreciation of God. Northrop Frye accurately de
scribes the essence of this passage: “The end of the world, the apocalypse, is the
objective counterpart of the resurrection of man, his return to the titanic bodily
form he originally possessed” (Frye 194). The apocalypse serves as a poetic fig
ure for man’s return from the tyranny of false religion to the imaginative world of
the poets- a move found nowhere in Hume.
The visionary poetic realm Blake exalts is connected to energetic activity;
one of the Proverbs of Hell proclaims, “Exuberance is beauty” , and such beauty
appears available only to those with “enlarged & numerous senses” such as the
originary poets possessed (Blake 38). The connection is further clarified in Plate
14:
The ancient tradition that the world will be consumed in
fire at the end of six thousand years is true, as I have heard from
Hell.
For the cherub with his flaming sword is hereby command
ed to leave his guard at the tree of life, and when he does, the
whole creation will be consumed, and appear infinite and holy
whereas it now appears finite & corrupt.
This will come to pass by an improvement of sensual enjoy
ment.
But first the notion that a man has a body distinct from his
soul, is to be expunged: this I shall do, by printing in the infernal
method, by corrosives, which in Hell are salutary and medicinal,
melting apparent surfaces away, and displaying the infinite which
was hid. (Blake 39)
Through the Proverbs of Hell, Blake has already connected infernal creativity
with energy; Plate 14 develops this link, with the “cherub with his flaming
sword” serving as a figure of energetic creativity parallel to Blake himself. Both
Blake and the cherub reveal a beauty previously hidden by the corruption of the
world; both do so through an energetic poetic creation symbolized by the cher-
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u b ’s sword. Since the “improvement of sensual enjoyment” produced by this ac
tivity is necessary to regain the ancient poets’ understanding of the Poetic
Genius, the energy and exuberance that have been lost in the corrupt present
must be restored. (The reference to corrosives specifically links creative liberation
to Blake’s method of printing his illuminated plates, suggesting the form of the
M arriage is a direct manifestation of spiritual poetic creation.) This artistic ener

gy is connected to desire through the juxtaposition of the Devil’s discussion of
the former in Plate 4 with Blake’s depiction of the latter in Plate 5:
Those who restrain desire, do so because theirs is weak
enough to be restrained; and the restrainer or reason usurps its
place & governs the unwilling.
And being restrained it by degrees becomes passive till it is
only the shadow of desire. (Blake 34)
In positing this apparent opposition between reason and desire, between passivi
ty and active creative energy, Blake draws on an idea which Hume delineates at
length. Hume distinguishes between these two concepts in Section X of the
Natural History. “With Regard to Courage or Abasement.” Hume aligns energy
and activity with polytheism, particularly the Greek gods, and passivity with
Catholic saints. He locates the difference in the degree of power attributed to the
gods in polytheism:
Where the deity is represented as infinitely superior to
mankind, this belief, though altogether just, is apt, when joined
with superstitious terrors, to sink the human mind into the lowest
submission and abasement, and to represent the monkish virtues
of mortification, penance, humility, and passive suffering, as the
only qualities which are acceptable to him. But where the gods
are conceived to be only a little advanced from mankind, and to
have been, many of them, advanced from that inferior rank, we are
more at our ease, in our addresses to them, and may even, without
profaneness, aspire sometimes to a rivalship and emulation of
them. Hence activity, spirit, courage, magnaminity, love of liberty,
and all the virtues which aggrandize a people. (Hume 52)
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Hume’s sympathy clearly lies with the active virtues fostered by polytheism as
found in the ancient pagan world of Greece and Rome; he notes Machiavelli’s
comment that Christian doctrine had made mankind fit for slavery. Hume’s depic
tion of Christianity is markedly similar to Blake’s account in Plate 11 of the priest
hood’s enslavement of mankind, though in Hume’s account the bondage comes
in the change to theism and not in the originary polytheism. This difference gives
Hume’s depiction a more clearly anti-Christian bias than Blake’s, which effects in
stead a transformation of Christianity through the acceptance of activity. Hume’s
celebration of activity is echoed by Blake, who celebrates energy throughout the
M arriage. The difference is once again in the elements of the conflict between

activity and passivity that Blake chooses to emphasize.
Hume’s celebration of heroic virtues has a specifically Hellenic context,
which Blake mirrors in his discussion of Paradise Lost on Plates 5-6. In celebrat
ing Milton as a “true poet and of the Devils party without knowing it,” Blake re
calls Milton’s depiction of Satan in terms of Hellenic heroism; Satan, particularly
in the first two books of P aradise L o st , exhibits an active determination to
liberate himself from Hell and build a new world for himself. His resolve, and
Milton’s depiction of him as a military leader during the war in Heaven, suggest
parallels between Satan and the Homeric epic heroes. Blake’s invocation of
Milton indicates an admiration of that activity parallel to Hume’s. Yet these plates
also introduce Blake’s unique twist to the subject: the idea of Christ as Hellenic
hero. Hume insists on an absolute distinction between Hellenic energy and
Hebraic passivity; Blake portrays a Christ defined more by activity than by suffer
ing. In Plates 5-6, Blake depicts the conflict in teims of a struggle between desire
and reason, and suggests that the two were united in the Messiah:
It indeed appear’d to Reason as if Desire was cast out. but
the Devils account is, that the Messiah fell. & formed a heaven of
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what he stole from the Abyss.
This is shewn in the Gospel, where he prays to the Father to
send the comforter or Desire that Reason may have Ideas to build
on, the Jehovah of the Bible being no other than he, who dwells in
flaming fire.
Know that after Christ’s death, he became Jehovah. (Blake
34-5)
Blake’s depiction of Christ suggests that heroic energy and passivity,
which appealed to be irreconcilable opposites in Hume, were actually conjoined
properly (or “diabolically”) in the Gospels. The M arriage further likens Blake’s
conception of Christ to the Poetic Genius, furthering the notion that God (united
in Christ and Jehovah) is indistinguishable from the human imagination. This por
trayal of Christ is reinforced in the final Memorable Fancy, where a Devil debates
an Angel on the nature of the worship of God. The Angel, infuriated by the
Devil’s suggestion that worship is “loving the greatest men best,” speaks in liter
al terms of God and Jesus Christ, mistaking the poetic figures for the reality. The
Devil offers his own alternate portrayal of Jesus which strengthens Blake’s earlier
characterization:
The Devil answer’d: bray a fool in a morter with wheat, yet
shall not his folly be beaten out of him: if Jesus Christ is the
greatest man, you ought to love him in the greatest degree; now
hear how he has given his sanction to the law of ten command
ments: did he not mock at the sabbath, and so mock the sabbaths
God? murder those who were murderd because of him? turn away
the law from the woman taken in adultery? steal the labor of oth
ers to support him? bear false witness when he omitted making a
defence before Pilate? covet when he pray’d for his disciples, and
when he bid them shake off the dust of their feet against such as
refused to lodge them? I tell you, no virtue can exist without
breaking these ten commandments: Jesus was all virtue, and acted
from impulse: not from rules. (Blake 43)
Blake’s theology in this passage is highly unorthodox, particularly his claim that
Christ committed murder, but the Devil’s relentless questioning has a positive pur

30
pose. Where the angel smugly reiterates a received point of view, the Devil en
gages in creative activity by asking a series of questions. In reconceptualizing
Christ in terms of energy, the Devil exemplifies the theory he espouses. He also
sharpens the distinction from Blake’s notes between “Act” and “Vice.” Christ’s
violations of laws served a beneficial purpose, and so were “Acts” opposed to
the stultifying obedience of the angel. The depiction of the Ten Commandments
connects to the earlier speech of Ezekiel, which suggested the oppressive nature
of the Jews’ code of law. The Devil suggests that all religious law is repressive of
energy and therefore evil; in so doing, he portrays Christ as a Greek hero, with
“virtue” defined not in the prevailing eighteenth-century Christian sense of sex
ual chastity, but in the Hellenic sense of active courage.
At the same time, Blake’s account does not claim this is the only side to
Christ; much as the Songs o f Innocence and Songs o f Experience contain parallel
visions of the lamb and the tyger, so the M arriage reestablishes the dual nature of
Christ. If the M arriage emphasizes the energetic qualities of Christ, it is more be
cause these aspects of his being have been neglected than because they are the
only aspects. This restoration of Christ’s duality is not explicitly expressed in the
descriptions of Jesus, but is instead manifested in the M arriage's presentation of
contraries. This element of the M arriage points to one additional conjunction
with Hume’s Natural History of Religion: a sense of balance.
At first the M arriage does not seem balanced in the same sense as Hume’s
work. Hume maintains a merely linguistic sense of balance by yoking descrip
tions of rises and falls, moving from elegantly rational language in his descriptions
of the beautiful to a more agitated, frenetic syntax to capture the sensation of ter
ror experienced by primitive man. This characteristic is exemplified by the juxta
position of two sentences in the first chapter: “On the contrary, the more regular
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and uniform, that is, the more perfect nature appears, the more is he [primitive
man] familiarized to it, and the less inclined to scrutinize and examine it. A mon
strous birth excites his curiosity, and is deemed a prodigy” (Hume 24-5). The first
sentence captures the calm, measured thinking of a rational Enlightenment
philosopher, reflecting logically on the nature of the world. The second reflects
the thinking of Hume’s theoretical primitive man in the moment of fear, creating
gods from natural phenomena out of terrified ignorance. Hume’s balancing, how
ever, is primarily stylistic; there is little interaction between the contraries con
tained in his sentences, as Hume consistently privileges the Hellenic over the
Hebraic.
Blake, in contrast, indulges in a more excessive, energetic language em
bodied by the Proverbs of Hell. This apparent indulgence is reflected in the
M arriage's structure.

The work begins with “The Argument”, a preliminary

poem, but is not similarly balanced by a closing poem; “A Song of Liberty” is
technically not part of the M arriage , and is structured in a series of numbered
lines far removed from “The Argument”’s more traditional verses. In between,
Blake’s prose sections do not initially appear to be structured by any overarching
principle; there are few overt narrative connections between sections (the link be
tween the first “Memorable Fancy” and the “Proverbs of Hell” is an exception),
and the individual sections do not follow the model of philosophical argument
used by Hume. As Martin K. Nurmi notes, “it is developed according to no tradi
tional logical or rhetorical plan” (Nurmi 28).
There is, however, a balance to the M arriage's form which is not immedi
ately apparent. Nurmi suggests that the M arriage resembles “the A-B-A’ of the
ternary form in music, in which a first theme and its development are followed by
a second theme and its development, followed in turn by a return to the first sec

32
tion or a modification of it” (Nurmi 29). Prior to the first “Memorable Fancy” ,
the idea of contraries dominates the text; the emphasis then shifts to expanded
sense perception. Blake develops this idea at length before returning to con
traries in the third “Memorable Fancy”; when the first theme returns, though, it is
combined with the themes of the second section, as expanded sense perception
becomes necessary for the productive interaction of contraries. With this musical
structure, Blake merges the underlying balance of the Enlightenment with a sur
face appearance of disarray; the work’s form thus reflects its combination of
seemingly contradictory ideas.
Blake’s privileging of energy in the text is similarly not absolute. Northrop
Frye comments that “ The M arriage o f Heaven and H ell . . . has nothing to do
with the simple inversion of moral good and evil which is known as sadism, and
which forms an important aspect of Romantic culture” (Frye 198). Instead, Blake
focuses on the necessity of the interaction of contraries for the move towards the
recognition of the Poetic Genius. Plate 3 establishes the idea of contraries which
Blake amplifies throughout the text:
Without Contraries is no progression. Attraction and repul
sion, Reason and Energy, Love and Hate, are necessary to Human
existence.
From these contraries spring what the religious call Good &
Evil. Good is the passive that obeys Reason. Evil is the active
springing from Energy.
Good is Heaven. Evil is Hell. (Blake 34)
Blake’s starting point is the transvaluation of values later delineated by
Nietzsche, in which Hellenic good (energy) becomes Christian evil and Hellenic
evil (passivity) becomes Christian good. Like Hume, Blake expresses an admira
tion for Hellenic virtue and attempts to partially reverse the trans valuation of val
ues by celebrating energy. Blake’s view is more complicated than this, though, as
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is made apparent in Plate 4, “The voice of the Devil.” Here, the Devil poses as a
contrary to the notion that “God will torment Man in Eternity for following his
Energies” the idea that “Energy is the only life and is from the Body and Reason
is the bound or outward circumference of Energy” (Blake 34). The interdepen
dence of reason and energy later delineated in Blake’s portrayal of Christ is es
tablished here, suggesting that energy must work in opposition to the “outward
circumference” formed by reason to be genuinely productive. Without the op
posing force of reason to work against, energy will be unproductive. As long as
the body, as a portion of soul, remains bound by the five senses, dynamic energy
and limiting reason will be engaged in a dialectical exchange. Instead of a return
to simple Hellenic values, then, Blake attempts to reach an understanding of the
true roles of energy and reason in human existence.
Blake further explores this dynamic in Plate 16, with his tale of “the Giants
who formed this world into sensual existence” (Blake 40). Here, Blake indicates
that the division between energy and reason is the product of the fallen state
which prevents us from achieving a full appreciation of the Poetic Genius; thus, in
the poetic vision of Plate 11, no such dichotomy existed. In Plate 16 Blake sug
gests the Giants are the true manifestations of the Poetic Genius, chained because
of the dominance of reason over energy. He then delineates two classes of
human beings resulting from this division:
Thus one portion of being, is the Prolific, the other, the De
vouring: to the devourer it seems as if the producer was in his
chains, but it is not so, he only takes portions of existence and fan
cies that the whole.
But the Prolific would cease to be Prolific unless the
Devourer as a sea recieved the excess of his delights.
Some will say, Is not God alone the Prolific? I answer, God
only Acts & Is, in existing beings or Men.
These two classes of men are always upon earth, & they
should be enemies; whoever tries to reconcile them seeks to de
stroy existence.
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Religion is an endeavour to reconcile the two. (Blake 40)
This passage reinforces Blake’s earlier portrayal of contraries, by suggesting that
the continual conflict of these “enemies” is necessary for the survival of hu
mankind. This battle is necessary for the productive activity through which the
human race can fully perceive the Poetic Genius; for the imaginative apocalypse
of Plate 14 to occur, the Prolific and the Devourer must engage in this productive
struggle. By trying to reconcile the opposites, by combining them in a fashion
which does not allow for productive activity, the contemporary Christianity
Blake assails removes all potential for creative change.
Much as Hume’s figural analysis determines the shape of his argument and
his choice of language, so Blake’s artistic conception of the deity shapes his solu
tion to the problem of contraries. The move beyond the senses to an infinite state
is figured consistently in artistic terms mirroring the original creation of poetic fic
tions. The first Memorable Fancy depicts a Devil who writes upon a rock with
“corroding fires” (a parallel to Blake’s process of illuminated printing); his mes
sage indicates the infinite which Isaiah later claims to have seen in all things, sug
gesting the transcendence of the senses shall come about through artistic pro
cesses. This image is further reinforced in Plate 14 by Blake’s reference to “corro
sives, which in Hell are salutary and medicinal” (Blake 39). The soul and the
body can only be revealed as indistinguishable from each other by way of a cre
ation of poetic figures, cleansing the world of the misinterpretations of the old fig
ures and reestablishing the infinite.
Hume’s General Corollary to the Natural History uses language similar to
Blake’s in putting forth the argument from design: “A purpose, an intention, a de
sign is evident in every thing; and when our comprehension is so far enlarged as
to contemplate the first rise of this visible system, we must adopt, with the strong
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est conviction, the idea of some intelligent cause or author” (Hume 74). Hume’s
“enlargement” of comprehension resembles Blake’s idea of expanded sense per
ception, but with the key difference that Hume seeks a purely rational expansion.
While Blake also seeks an “enlargement,” it is of a very different sort; only
expanded sense perception (not reason or “comprehension”) will reveal God.
Blake seeks to reveal not a design, but instead the presence of God in all things
through the poetic imagination. In his account of artistic transcendence, Blake
ironizes the argument that Hume supports; even if we could see a design in all
things, our senses are inadequate, and must be cleansed before we can perceive
the infinite.
Blake’s conception of religion is ultimately both part of the Enlightenment
and radically different from the eighteenth century’s intellectual mainstream. An
understanding of B lake’s com bination of Humean philosophy with
Swedenborgian mysticism illuminates the traditional reading of The M arriage o f
Heaven and H ell. Blake’s vision of God as the poetic imagination is not simply a

product of Romantic thinking, as Abrams appears to assume; instead, Blake com
bines elements of Swedenborg (particularly his conception of God), revises them
to fit with his populism, and uses these ideas to rewrite Enlightenment theology.
Blake’s linkage of energetic activity with humanity’s poetic creation of the divine
contrasts dramatically with the terror-stricken primitives of Hume and Vico, but
Blake draws on and transforms both their theories and their sense of balanced
form. The M arriage s vision of a balanced universe in which contraries operate in
productive opposition is inseparable from Blake’s manipulation of Enlightenment
and counter-Enlightenment theology. These two strains are the contraries whose
productive interplay results in Blake’s imaginative vision of God.
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NOTES

* The connection between Blake and the Enlightenment is dealt with in Wayne Glausser’s
“Atomistic Simulacra in the Enlightenment and Blake’s Post-Enlightenment” {The
Eighteenth Century: Theory and Interpretation 32:1, 73-88) and Daniel Stempel’s “Blake,
Foucault, and the Classical Episteme” (PMLA 96:3, 388-407). The former deals primarily
with Milton and Jerusalem in its consideration of Blake as a post-Enlightenment (i.e.
Romantic) writer; the latter discusses Blake’s relationship to the Enlightenment in similarly
traditional terms, viewing Blake as primarily a Romantic rebel.

Neither deals with The

Marriage of Heaven and Hell at any length, and neither suggests that Blake incorporated ele
ments of Enlightenment theology into his writing.
n

* This thesis does not discuss the relationships between Blake’s illuminations and the text.
The interaction between Blake’s illustrations and his text can shed light on the meaning of the
Marriage', in particular, his interlinear illuminations often relate directly to the text. For ex
ample, Geoffrey Keynes notes than one of Blake’s interlinear drawings on Plate 4 depicts
Joseph of Arimathea “preaching Christianity, that is artistic energy, to the people” (Keynes
38). In this respect, Blake’s illustrations reinforce his portrayal of the deity as artistic energy
and his idea of contraries; they also differentiate the Marriage from the rational philosophical
approach of Hume, adding an emotional appeal to Blake’s work. To discuss the illuminations
at length, however, is beyond the scope of this thesis; it would take a far lengthier paper to do
justice to their importance. This thesis limits its discussion of Blake’s visual artistry to noting
the parallels, discussed by Blake in the text, between his process of illuminated printing and
the divine power of artistic creation.

^ For more information on Blake’s relationship to Swedenborg’s writings, see G.E. Bent
ley, Jr. ’s “A Swedenborgian Bible” {Blake: An Illustrated Quarterly 24:2, 63-64), Donald
John’s “Blake and Forgiveness” {The Wordsworth Circle 17:2, 74-80), and Marsha Keith
Schu-chard’s “The Secret Masonic History of Blake’s Swedenborg Society” {Blake: An
Illustrated Quarterly 26:2, 40-51). Bentley focuses on the continuing influence of Sweden
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borg in Blake’s later visionary prophecies. John discusses the marginalia, especially the influ
ence of Swedenborg in Blake’s notes on Lavater. Schuchard deals primarily with the history
of the Swedenborg society Blake briefly belonged to, as well as with the myth that Blake’s
parents were Swedenborgians.

^ Plate 11 is not devoid of ambiguity; the phrase “Till a system was formed” suggests
that the original poetic creation contained within it the potential for abuse. The ancient poets
themselves may have been responsible for an unhealthy degree of reification which allowed
the priests to “realize and abstract the mental dieties from their objects.” On the whole,
though, Blake appears to place the blame on the priests, and the originary poets are portrayed
in mostly positive terms.

^ Blake does not always blame societal conditions; “The Human Abstract,” for example,
suggests the root of evil lies “in the Human Brain” (Blake 27). “Infant Sorrow” provides a
similar portrait, as its newborn baby is “like a fiend hid in a cloud” (Blake 28). In the
Songs o f Innocence and die Songs o f Experience, Blake frequently places contraries beside
each other in different poems; as a result, he does not provide a definitive indication of which
point of view he believes. The Marriage, however, concentrates on the positive virtues of hu
manity, providing a view of humanity devoid of original sin; in this respect, it is closer to the
egalitarian poems Erdman cites than the contrary position also offered in the Songs.
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